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ABSTRACT
We develop a general equilibrium model of government policy choice in which stock prices respond
to political news. The model implies that political uncertainty commands a risk premium whose magnitude
is larger in weaker economic conditions. Political uncertainty reduces the value of the implicit put
protection that the government provides to the market. It also makes stocks more volatile and more
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Political news has been dominating ﬁnancial markets recently. Day after day, asset prices
seem to react to news about what governments around the world have done or might do. As
an example, consider the ongoing sovereign debt crisis in Europe. When European politicians
announced a deal cutting Greece’sdebt in half on October 27, 2011, the S&P 500 index soared
by 3.4%, while French and German stocks gained more than 5%. Early in the following week,
stocks gave back all of those gains when Greece’s prime minister announced his intention
to hold a referendum on the deal. When other Greek politicians voiced their opposition
to that initiative, stocks rose sharply again. It seems stunning that the pronouncements of
politicians from a country whose GDP is smaller than that of Michigan can instantly create
or destroy hundreds of billions of dollars of market value around the world.
Regrettably, our ability to interpret the impact of political news on ﬁnancial markets is
constrained by the lack of theoretical guidance. Models in which asset prices respond to
political news are notably absent from mainstream ﬁnance theory. We try to ﬁll this gap,
and we use our model to study the asset pricing implications of political uncertainty.
Political uncertainty has become prominent not only in Europe but also in the United
States. For example, the ratings ﬁrm Standard & Poor’s cited political uncertainty among
the chief reasons behind its unprecedented downgrade of the U.S. Treasury debt in August
2011.1 Even prior to the political brinkmanship over the statutory debt ceilingin the summer
of 2011, much uncertainty surrounded the U.S. government policy changes during and after
the ﬁnancial crisis of 2007-2008, such as the various bailout schemes, the Wall Street reform,
and the health care reform. Yet, despite the apparent relevance of political uncertainty for
global ﬁnancial markets, we know little about its eﬀects on asset prices.
How does uncertainty about future government actions aﬀect market prices? On the one
hand, this uncertainty could have a positive eﬀect if the government responds properly to
unanticipated shocks. For example, we generally do not insist on knowing in advance how
exactly a doctor will perform a complex surgery; should unforeseeable circumstances arise,
it is useful for a qualiﬁed surgeon to have the freedom to depart from the initial plan. In
the same spirit, governments often intervene in times of trouble, which might lead investors
to believe that governments provide put protection on asset prices (e.g., the “Greenspan
1The “debate this year has highlighted a degree of uncertainty over the political policymaking process
which we think is incompatible with the AAA rating,” said David Beers, managing director of sovereign
credit ratings at Standard & Poor’s, on a conference call with reporters on August 6, 2011.
1put”). On the other hand, political uncertainty could have a negative eﬀect because it is not
fully diversiﬁable. Non-diversiﬁable risk generally depresses asset prices by raising discount
rates.2 Both of these eﬀects arise endogenously in our theoretical model.
We analyze the eﬀects of political uncertainty on stock prices in the context of a general
equilibriummodel. In our model, ﬁrm proﬁtability follows a stochastic process whose mean is
aﬀected by the prevailing government policy. The policy’s impact on the mean is uncertain.
Both the government and the investors (ﬁrm owners) learn about this impact in a Bayesian
fashion by observing realized proﬁtability. At a given point in time, the government makes
a policy decision—it decides whether to change its policy and if so, which of potential new
policies to adopt. The potential new policies are viewed as heterogeneous a priori—agents
expect diﬀerent policies to have diﬀerent impacts, with diﬀerent degrees of prior uncertainty.
If a policy change occurs, the agents’ beliefs are reset: the posterior beliefs about the old
policy’s impact are replaced by the prior beliefs about the new policy’s impact.
When making its policy decision, the government is motivated by both economic and
non-economic objectives: it maximizes the investors’ welfare, as a social planner would, but
it also takes into account the political costs (or beneﬁts) associated with adopting any given
policy. These costs are uncertain, as a result of which investors cannot fully anticipate which
policy the government is going to choose. Uncertainty about political costs is the source of
political uncertainty in the model. Agents learn about political costs by observing political
signals that we interpret as outcomes of various political events.
Solving for the optimal government policy choice, we ﬁnd that a policy is more likely to
be adopted if its political cost is lower and if its impact on proﬁtability is perceived to be
higher or less uncertain. As a result of this decision rule, a policy change is more likely in
weaker economic conditions, in which the current policy is typically perceivedas harmful. By
replacing poorly-performing policies in bad times, the government eﬀectively provides put
protection to the market. The value of this protection is reduced, though, by the ensuing
uncertainty about which of the potential new policies will replace the outgoing policy.
We explore the asset pricing implications of our model. We show that stock prices are
driven by three types of shocks, which we call capital shocks, impact shocks, and political
shocks. The ﬁrst two types of shocks are driven by shocks to aggregate capital. These
fundamental economic shocks aﬀect stock prices both directly, by aﬀecting the amount of
2For example, some commentators argue that the risk premia in the eurozone have been inﬂated due to
political uncertainty. According to Harald Uhlig, “The risk premium in the markets amounts to a premium
on the uncertainty of what Merkel and Sarkozy will do.” (Bloomberg Businessweek, July 28, 2011).
2capital, and indirectly, by leading investors to revise their beliefs about the impact of the
prevailing government policy. We refer to the direct eﬀect as capital shocks and to the
indirect eﬀect as impact shocks. We also refer to both capital and impact shocks jointly
as economic shocks. The third type of shocks, political shocks, are orthogonal to economic
shocks. Political shocks arise due to learning about the political costs associated with the
potential new policies. These shocks, which reﬂect the ﬂow of political news, lead investors
to revise their beliefs about the likelihood of the various government policy choices.
We decompose the equity risk premium into three components, which correspond to
the three types of shocks introduced above. We ﬁnd that all three components contribute
substantially to the risk premium. Interestingly, political shocks command a risk premium
despite being unrelated to economic shocks. Investors demand compensation for uncertainty
about the outcomes of purely political events, such as debates and negotiations. Those
events matter to investors because they aﬀect the investors’ beliefs about which policy the
government might adopt in the future. We refer to the political-shock component of the
equity premium as the political risk premium. Another component, that induced by impact
shocks, compensates investorsfor a diﬀerent aspect of uncertainty about government policy—
uncertainty about the impact of the current policy on ﬁrm proﬁtability.
We ﬁnd that the composition of the equity risk premium is highly state-dependent.
Importantly, the political risk premium is larger in weaker economic conditions. In fact,
when the conditions are very weak, the political risk premium is the largest component of
the equity premium in our baseline calibration. In a weaker economy, the government is
more likely to adopt a new policy. Therefore, news about which new policy is likely to be
adopted—political shocks—have a larger impact on stock prices in a weaker economy.
In strong economic conditions, the political risk premium is small, but the impact-shock
component of the equity premium is large. When times are good, the current policy is likely
to be retained, so news about the current policy’s impact—impact shocks—have a large eﬀect
on stock prices. Impact shocks matter less when times are bad because the current policy
is then likely to be replaced, so its impact is temporary. Interestingly, impact shocks often
matter the most when times are neither good nor bad, but rather slightly below average. In
such intermediate states, investors are the most uncertain about whether the current policy
will be retained. Impact shocks then aﬀect stock prices by revising not only the investors’
perception of expected proﬁtability, but also their perception of the probability of a policy
change. As a result, investors demand extra compensation for holding stocks, and the equity
premium exhibits a hump-shaped dependence on economic conditions.
3The equity premium in weak economic conditions is aﬀected by two opposing forces. On
the one hand, the premium is pulled down by the government’s implicit put protection—the
fact that the government is likely to change its policy in a weak economy. This protection
reduces the equity premium by making the eﬀect of impact shocks temporary and thereby
depressing the premium’s impact-shock component. On the other hand, the premium is
pushed up by political uncertainty, as explained earlier. In our baseline calibration, the two
eﬀects roughly cancel out. More generally, political uncertainty reduces the value of the
implicit put protection that the government provides to the markets.
Political uncertainty pushes up not only the equity risk premium but also the volatilities
and correlations of stock returns. As a result, stocks tend to be more volatile and more
correlated when the economy is weak. The volatilities and correlations are also higher when
the potential new government policies are perceived as more heterogeneous a priori.
The government’s ability to change its policy has a substantial but ambiguous eﬀect on
stock prices. We compare the model-implied stock prices with their counterparts in a hypo-
thetical scenario in which policy changes are precluded. We ﬁnd that the ability to change
policy generally makes stocks more volatile and more correlated in poor economic condi-
tions. Interestingly, this ability can imply a higher or lower level of stock prices compared
to the hypothetical scenario. Speciﬁcally, the government’s ability to change policy is good
for stock prices in dire economic conditions, but it depresses prices when the conditions are
typical or only slightly below average.
When the government announces its policy decision, stock prices jump. The expected
value of the jump represents the risk premium that compensates investors for holding stocks
during this announcement. This jump risk premium can be fully attributed to political
uncertainty. We ﬁnd that this premium is generally higher when economic conditions are
weaker as well as when there is more policy heterogeneity. These results support our prior
conclusions about the pricing of political uncertainty.
We also show analytically that the announcement of a welfare-improving government
policy decision need not produce a positive stock market reaction, nor does a positive market
reaction imply that the newly adopted policy is welfare-improving. Among policies delivering
the same welfare, the policies whose impact on proﬁtability is more uncertain, such as deeper
reforms, elicit less favorable stock market reactions. The broader lesson is that one cannot
judge government policies solely by their announcement returns.
While our main contribution is theoretical, we also conduct some simple empirical analy-
4sis. To proxy for political uncertainty, we use the recently developed policy uncertainty index
of Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2011). We examine the following predictions of our model: po-
litical uncertainty should be higher in a weaker economy; stocks should be more volatile and
more correlated when political uncertainty is higher; political uncertainty should command
a risk premium; the eﬀects of political uncertainty on volatility, correlation, and risk premia
should be stronger when the economy is weaker. We ﬁnd evidence consistent with all of
these predictions, although the strength of the evidence varies across the predictions.
There is a small but growing amount of theoretical work on the eﬀects of government-
induced uncertainty on asset prices. Sialm (2006) analyzes the eﬀect of stochastic taxes on
asset prices, and ﬁnds that investors require a premium to compensate for the risk introduced
by tax changes.3 Tax uncertainty also features in Croce, Kung, Nguyen, and Schmid (2011),
who explore its asset pricing implicationsin a production economy with recursive preferences.
Croce, Nguyen, and Schmid (2011) examine the eﬀects of ﬁscal uncertainty on long-term
growth when agents facing model uncertainty care about the worst-case scenario. Finally,
Ulrich (2011) analyzes the premium required by bond investors for Knightian uncertainty
about both Ricardian equivalence and the size of the government multiplier. All of these
studies are quite diﬀerent from ours. They analyze ﬁscal policy, whereas we consider a
broader set of government actions. They use very diﬀerent modeling techniques, and they
do not model the government’s policy decision explicitly as we do. None of these studies
feature Bayesian learning, which plays an important role here.
Our model is also diﬀerent from the learning models that were recently proposed in the
political economy literature, such as Callander (2011) and Strulovici (2010). In Callander’s
model, voters learn about the eﬀects of government policies through repeated elections.
In Strulovici’s model, voters learn about their preferences through policy experimentation.
Neither study analyzes the asset pricing implications of learning.
P´ astor and Veronesi (2012) develop a related model of government policy choice that dif-
fers from ours in two key respects. First, in their model, all government policies are perceived
as identical a priori, whereas we consider heterogeneous policies. Policy heterogeneity is cru-
cial to our results; for example, it induces an endogenous increase in political uncertainty
in poor economic conditions. When the conditions get worse, the probability of a policy
change rises, and so does the importance of uncertainty about which of the potential new
policies will be adopted. In contrast, such uncertainty would be irrelevant if all potential
3Other studies, such as McGrattan and Prescott (2005), Sialm (2009), and Gomes, Michaelides, and
Polkovnichenko (2009), relate stock prices to tax rates, without emphasizing tax-related uncertainty.
5new policies were identical a priori, as in P´ astor and Veronesi’s model. We ﬁnd that policy
heterogeneity has a substantial eﬀect on the equity risk premium, as well as on other prop-
erties of stock prices such as their level, volatility, and correlations. Second, in our model,
agents learn about the political costs of the potential new policies. This learning introduces
additional shocks to the economy, political shocks, which are the source of all of our main
results, including the political risk premium. In addition, our study has a diﬀerent focus.
P´ astor and Veronesi analyze the stock market reaction to the government’s policy decision,
whereas we focus on the risk premium induced by political uncertainty.
There is a modest amount of empirical work relating political uncertainty to the equity
risk premium. Erb, Harvey, and Viskanta (1996) ﬁnd a weak relation between political risk,
measured by the International Country Risk Guide, and future stock returns. Pantzalis,
Stangeland, and Turtle (2000) and Li and Born (2006) ﬁnd abnormally high stock market
returns in the weeks preceding major elections, especially for elections characterized by
high degrees of uncertainty. This evidence is consistent with a positive relation between the
equity premium and political uncertainty. Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003) relate the equity
risk premium to political cycles. Belo, Gala, and Li (2011) link the cross-section of stock
returns to ﬁrms’ exposures to the government sector. Bittlingmayer(1998), Voth (2002), and
Boutchkova, Doshi, Durnev, and Molchanov (2010) ﬁnd a positive relation between political
uncertainty and stock volatility in a variety of settings. The literature has also related
political uncertainty to private sector investment.4 Finally, the literature has analyzed the
eﬀects of uncertainty about government policy on inﬂation, capital ﬂows, and welfare.5
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 analyzes the
government’s policy decision. Sections 4 and 5 present our results on the pricing of polit-
ical uncertainty. Section 6 examines the risk premium associated with the policy decision.
Section 7 shows our empirical analysis. Section 8 concludes. The Appendix contains some
details as well as a reference to the Technical Appendix, which contains all the proofs.
4For example, Julio and Yook (2012) ﬁnd that ﬁrms reduce their investment prior to major elections.
Durnev (2011) ﬁnds that corporate investment is less sensitive to stock prices during election years. Baker,
Bloom, and Davis (2011) ﬁnd that policy uncertainty reduces investment and increases unemployment.
5For example, Drazen and Helpman (1990) study how uncertainty about a future ﬁscal adjustment aﬀects
the dynamics of inﬂation. Hermes and Lensink (2001) show that uncertainty about budget deﬁcits, tax
payments, government consumption, and inﬂation is positively related to capital outﬂows at the country level.
Gomes, Kotlikoﬀ, and Viceira (2012) calibrate a life-cycle model to measure the welfare losses resulting from
uncertainty about government policies regarding taxes and Social Security. They ﬁnd that policy uncertainty
materially aﬀects agents’ consumption, saving, labor supply, and portfolio decisions.
62. The Model
Similar to P´ astor and Veronesi (2012), we consider an economy with a ﬁnite horizon [0,T]
and a continuum of ﬁrms i ∈ [0,1]. Let Bi
t denote ﬁrm i’s capital at time t. Firms are
ﬁnanced entirely by equity, so Bi
t can also be viewed as book value of equity. At time 0, all
ﬁrms employ an equal amount of capital, which we normalize to Bi
0 = 1. Firm i’s capital is
invested in a linear technology whose rate of return is stochastic and denoted by dΠi
t. All





equals proﬁts over book value, we refer to it as the proﬁtability of ﬁrm i. For all t ∈ [0,T],
proﬁtability follows the process
dΠ
i
t = (µ + gt)dt + σdZt + σ1dZ
i
t , (1)
where (µ,σ,σ1) are observable constants, Zt is a Brownian motion, and Zi
t is an independent
Brownian motion that is speciﬁc to ﬁrm i. The variable gt denotes the impact of the prevailing
government policy on the mean of the proﬁtability process of each ﬁrm. If gt = 0, the
government policy is “neutral” in that it has no impact on proﬁtability.
The government policy’s impact, gt, is constant while the same policy is in eﬀect. The
value of gt can change only at a given time τ, 0 < τ < T, when the government makes an
irreversible policy decision.6 At that time τ, the government decides whether to replace the
current policy and, if so, which of N potential new policies to adopt. That is, the government
chooses one of N + 1 policies, where policies n = {1,...,N} are the potential new policies
and policy 0 is the “old” policy prevailing since time 0. Let g0 denote the impact of the old
policy and gn denote the impact of the n-th new policy, for n = {1,...,N}. The value of gt





g0 for t ≤ τ
g0 for t > τ if the old policy is retained (i.e., no policy change)
gn for t > τ if the new policy n is chosen, n ∈ {1,...,N} .
(2)
A policy change replaces g0 by gn, thereby inducing a permanent shift in average proﬁtability.
A policy decision becomes eﬀective immediately after its announcement at time τ.
The value of gt is unknown for all t ∈ [0,T]. This key assumption captures the idea that
government policies have an uncertain impact on ﬁrm proﬁtability. As of time 0, the prior
6The assumption that τ is exogenous dramatically simpliﬁes the analysis. If the government were al-
lowed to choose the optimal τ, the double-learning problem analyzed in Sections 2.1 and 2.2 would become
intractable. Conceptually, though, we do not see any reason why relaxing this assumption should aﬀect our
basic conclusions about the asset pricing eﬀects of political uncertainty.


















for n = {1,...,N} . (4)
The old policy is expected to be neutral a priori, without loss of generality. The new policies




unknown to all agents—the government as well as the investors who own the ﬁrms.
The ﬁrms are owned by a continuum of identical investors who maximize expected utility

















T is investor j’s wealth at time T and γ > 1 is the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion.
At time 0, all investors are equally endowed with shares of ﬁrm stock. Stocks pay liquidating
dividends at time T.7 Investors always know which government policy is in place.
When making its policy decision at time τ, the government maximizes the same objective
function as the investors, except that it also faces a nonpecuniary cost (or beneﬁt) associated













where WT = BT =
R 1
0 Bi
Tdi is the ﬁnal value of aggregate capital and Cn is the “political
cost” incurred by the government if policy n is adopted. Values of Cn > 1 represent a cost
(e.g., the government must exert eﬀort or burn political capital to implement policy n),
whereas Cn < 1 represents a beneﬁt (e.g., policy n allows the government to make a transfer
to a favored constituency).8 We normalize C0 = 1, so that retaining the old policy is known
with certainty to present no political costs or beneﬁts to the government. The political costs
of the new policies, {Cn}
N
n=1, are revealed to all agents at time τ. Immediately after the
Cn values are revealed, the government makes its policy decision. As of time 0, the prior














for n = {1,...,N} , (7)
7No dividends are paid before time T because the investors’ preferences (equation (5)) do not involve
intermediate consumption. Firms in our model reinvest all of their earnings, as mentioned earlier.
8We refer to Cn as a cost because higher values of Cn translate into lower utility (as W
1−γ
T /(1 − γ) < 0).
8where the cn values are uncorrelated across policies as well as independent of the Brownian
motions in equation (1). Uncertainty about {Cn}
N
n=1, which is given by σc as of time 0, is
the source of political uncertainty in our model. Due to this uncertainty, stock prices before
time τ respond to political news, as explained later in Sections 2.2 and 4.2.
Given its objective function in equation (6), the government is “quasi-benevolent”: it
is expected to maximize the investors’ welfare (because E0 [Cn] = 1 for all n), but also
to deviate from this objective in a random fashion. The assumption that governments do
not behave as fully benevolent social planners is widely accepted in the political economy
literature. This literature presents various reasons why governments might not maximize
aggregate welfare. For example, governments care about the distribution of wealth.9 Gov-
ernments tend to be inﬂuenced by special interest groups.10 They might also be susceptible
to corruption.11 Instead of modeling these political forces explicitly, we adopt a simple
reduced-form approach to capturing departures from benevolence. In our model, all aspects
of politics—redistribution, corruption, special interests, etc.—are bundled together in the po-
litical costs {Cn}
N
n=1. The randomness of these costs reﬂects the diﬃculty investors face in
predicting the outcome of the political process, which can be complex and non-transparent.
For example, it can be hard to predict the outcome of a battle between special interest
groups. By modeling politics in such a reduced-form fashion, we are able to focus on the
asset pricing implications of the uncertainty about government policy choice.
Government policies also merit more discussion. We interpret policy changes broadly as
government actions that change the economic environment. Examples include major reforms,
such as the recent Wall Street reform, health care reform, and the various ongoing structural
changes in the eurozone. Deeper reforms, or more radical policy changes, tend to introduce
a less familiar regulatory framework whose long-term impact on the private sector is often
more diﬃcult to assess in advance. Such policies might thus warrant relatively high values
of σg,n in equation (4). In contrast, a potential new policy that has already been tried in the
past might merit a lower σg,n if agents believe they have more prior information about that
policy’s impact. We abstract from the fact that government policies may aﬀect some ﬁrms
more than others, focusing on the aggregate eﬀects.
9Redistribution of wealth is a major theme in political economy. Prominent studies of redistribution
include Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Persson and Tabellini (1994), among others. Our model is not well
suited for analyzing redistribution eﬀects because all of our investors are identical ex ante, for simplicity.
10See, for example, Grossman and Helpman (1994) and Coate and Morris (1995).
11See, for example, Shleifer and Vishny (1993) and Rose-Ackerman (1999).
92.1. Learning About Policy Impacts
As noted earlier, the values of the policy impacts {gn}
N
n=0 are unknown to all agents, investors
and the government alike. At time 0, all agents share the prior beliefs summarized in
equations (3) and (4). Between times 0 and τ, all agents learn about g0, the impact of the
prevailing (old) policy, by observing the realized proﬁtabilities of all ﬁrms. The Bayesian
learning process is described in Proposition 1 of P´ astor and Veronesi (2012). Speciﬁcally,








where the posterior mean and variance evolve as













Above, db Zt denotes the expectation errors, which reﬂect shocks to the average proﬁtability
across all ﬁrms.12 When the average proﬁtability is higher than expected, agents revise their
beliefs about g0 upward, and vice versa (see equation (9)). Uncertainty about g0 declines
deterministically over time due to learning (see equation (10)). Before time τ, there is no
learning about the impacts of the new policies, so agents’ beliefs about {gn}
N
n=1 at any time
t ≤ τ are given by the prior distributions in equation (4).
If there is no policy change at time τ, then agents continue to learn about g0 after time
τ, and the processes (9) and (10) continue to hold also for t > τ. If there is a policy change
at time τ, agents stop learning about g0 and begin learning about gn, the impact of the new
policy n adopted by the government. As a result, a policy change resets agents’ beliefs about
gt from the posterior N (b gτ,b σ2






. Agents continue to learn about gn
in a Bayesian fashion until time T.
2.2. Learning About Political Costs
The political costs {Cn}
N
n=1 are unknown to all agents until time τ. At time t0 < τ, agents
begin learning about each cn by observing unbiased signals. We model these signals as






c,t , n = 1,...,N, (11)
12The db Zt shocks are related to the dZt shocks from equation (1) as follows: db Zt = dZt +
￿
(g0 − b gt)/σ
￿
dt.
10where 1/h denotes signal precision. The signals dsn
t are uncorrelated across n and indepen-
dent of any other shocks in the economy. We refer to these signals as “political signals,” and
interpret them as capturing the steady ﬂow of political news relevant to policy n. Real-world
agents observe numerous political speeches, debates, and negotiations on a daily basis. The
outcomes of these events help agents revise their beliefs about the political costs and beneﬁts
associated with the policies being debated.
Combining the signals in equation (11) with the prior distribution in equation (7), we











where the posterior mean and variance evolve as
db c
n
















Equation (13) shows that agents’ beliefs about cn are driven by the Brownian shocks db Zn
c,t,
which reﬂect the diﬀerences between the political signals dsn
t and their expectations (db Zn
c,t =
h−1 (dsn
t − Et [dsn
t ])). Since the political signals are independent of all “fundamental” shocks
in the economy (i.e., dZt and dZi
t), the innovations db Zn
c,t represent pure political shocks.
These shocks shape agents’ beliefs about which government policy is likely to be adopted
in the future, above and beyond the eﬀect of fundamental economic shocks. In reality,
political shocks might potentially be related to economic shocks in a complicated way. Our
assumption of independence allows us to emphasize later that even when political shocks are
orthogonal to economic shocks, they command a risk premium in equilibrium.
Our model exhibits two major diﬀerences from the model of P´ astor and Veronesi (2012).
First, we allow the government to choose from a set of policies that are perceived as het-
erogeneous a priori. P´ astor and Veronesi assume that the prior beliefs about the impacts
of all government policies are identical, which corresponds to µn
g = 0 and σ2
g,n = σ2
g for all
n in our setting. In contrast, we allow µn
g and σ2
g,n to vary across policies, as a result of
which uncertainty about which of the new policies the government might adopt becomes
important. Due to this uncertainty, policy heterogeneity generates an endogenous increase
in political uncertainty when economic conditions get worse and the probability of a policy
change rises. We also allow the political costs Cn to diﬀer across policies. Second, we allow
agents to learn about Cn before time τ. There is no such learning in P´ astor and Veronesi’s
model; their political cost is drawn at time τ from the prior distribution in equation (7).
11Learning about Cn introduces additional “political” shocks to the economy, which play a
crucial role in our paper. Finally, our focus diﬀers from that of P´ astor and Veronesi. They
emphasize the announcement returns associated with policy changes, whereas our objects
of interest are the risk premium, volatility, and correlation induced by political uncertainty.
They concentrate on the instantaneous price response at time τ, whereas we emphasize the
asset pricing eﬀects of a continuous stream of political shocks before time τ.
3. Optimal Government Policy Choice
In this section, we analyze how the government chooses its policy at time τ. After a period of
learning about g0 and {Cn}
N
n=1, the government chooses one of N +1 policies, {0,1,...,N},
at time τ. Recall that if the government replaces policy 0 by policy n, the value of gt changes
from g0 to gn and the perceived distribution of gt changes from the posterior in equation (8)








(T − τ)(γ − 1) n = 1,...,N (15)
e µ




(T − τ)(γ − 1) . (16)
To align the notation for the old policy with the notation for the new policies, we also deﬁne
µ
0
g = b gτ (17)
σg,0 = b στ , (18)
keeping in mind that µ0
g as well as e µ0 are stochastic, unlike their counterparts for the new
policies (for which there is no learning before time τ). Under this notation, at time τ, agents’






, where this distribution is a prior for
n = 1,...,N but a posterior for n = 0.
We refer to e µn in equations (15) and (16) as the “utility score” of policy n, for n =
0,1,...,N. This label can be easily understood in the context of the following lemma.


















if and only if
e µ
n > e µ
m . (20)
12Lemma 1 shows that the policy with the highest utility score delivers the highest utility
to investors at time τ. It follows immediately from the deﬁnition of the utility score that in-
vestors prefer policies whose impacts are perceived to have high means and/or low variances,
analogous to the popular mean-variance preferences in portfolio theory.
The government’s preferences diﬀer from the investors’ preferences due to political costs,
as shown in equation (6). The government chooses policy n at time τ if and only if the

















∀m 6= n .
The above condition yields our ﬁrst proposition.
Proposition 1: The government chooses policy n at time τ if and only if the following
condition holds for all policies m 6= n, m ∈ {0,1,...,N}:
e µ
n − e c
n > e µ






(γ − 1)(T − τ)
n = 0,1,...,N . (22)
Proposition 1 shows that the government chooses the policy with the highest value of
e µn −e cn across all n ∈ {0,...,N}. Recall that e c0 = 0 and that policy 0’s utility score e µ0 is a
simple function of b gτ (see equation (16)). We thus obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 1: The government changes its policy at time τ if and only if
b gτ < max
n∈{1,...,N}
{e µ





(T − τ)(γ − 1) . (23)
The government ﬁnds it optimal to change its policy if b gτ, the posterior mean of g0,
is suﬃciently low. That is, the old policy is replaced if its impact on ﬁrm proﬁtability is
perceived as suﬃciently unfavorable. This result is the basis for our interpretation later on
that the government eﬀectively provides put protection to the market.
Before time τ, agents face uncertainty about the government’s action at time τ because
they know neither b gτ nor the political costs. From Proposition 1, we derive the probabilities
of all potential government actions as perceived at any time t ≤ τ.
13Corollary 2: The probability that the government chooses policy n at time τ, evaluated at






Πm6=n,m∈{1,...,N} [1 − Φe cm (e c
n + e µ
m − e µ
n)]Φe µ0 (e µ
n − e c
n|b gt)φe cn (e c
n)de c
n . (24)
Above, φe cn (.) and Φe cn (.) are the normal pdf and cdf of e cn, respectively, and Φe µ0 is the normal
cdf of e µ0.13 The probability that the old policy will be retained is p0





In this section, we derive the asset pricing implications of political uncertainty. First, we
analyze the eﬀect of this uncertainty on the state price density. Next, we study how stock
prices depend on economic and political shocks. Finally, we examine the stock price response
to the resolution of political uncertainty when the government makes its policy decision.
Firm i’s stock is a claim on the ﬁrm’s liquidating dividend at time T, which is equal to
Bi












where πt denotes the state price density. The investors’ total wealth at time T is equal to
WT = BT =
R 1
0 Bi
Tdi. Since investors consume only at time T, there is no intertemporal
consumption choice that would pin down the risk-free interest rate, so this rate is indeter-
minate. We set it equal to zero, for simplicity.14 Our choice to model consumption from
ﬁnal wealth ensures that our asset pricing results are not driven by ﬂuctuations in the risk-
free rate but rather by risk premia, which are the focus of this paper. Assuming complete











where λ is the Lagrange multiplier from the utility maximization problem of the represen-
tative investor. This state price density is further characterized below.












2 (T − τ)(γ − 1), b σ2
t − b σ2
τ).
14This assumption is equivalent to assuming that a riskless zero-coupon bond with maturity T is chosen as
the numeraire in all stock price calculations. Both assumptions are commonly made when utility is deﬁned
over ﬁnal wealth; e.g., Kogan, Ross, Wang, and Westerﬁeld (2006) and Cuoco and Kaniel (2011).
144.1. The State Price Density
Our main focus is on the behavior of stock prices before political uncertainty is resolved
at time τ. Before time τ, agents learn about the impact of the old policy as well as the
political costs of the new policies. This learning generates stochastic variation in the posterior
means of g0 and {cn}
N






, represent stochastic state variables that aﬀect asset prices before time τ.
The posterior variances of g0 and {cn}
N
n=1 vary deterministically over time (see equations










The following proposition presents an analytical expression for the state price density.






where the function Ω(St) is given in equation (A1) in the Appendix.
The dynamics of πt, which are key for understanding the sources of risk in this economy,
are given in the following proposition, which follows from Proposition 2 by Ito’s lemma.
Proposition 3: The stochastic discount factor (SDF) follows the diﬀusion process
dπt
πt


























Equation (29) shows that the SDF is driven by three types of shocks, which we refer to
as capital shocks, impact shocks, and political shocks.
Capital shocks, measured by −γσdb Zt, are due to stochastic variation in total capital Bt.
In the ﬁltered probability space, Bt follows the process
dBt
Bt
= (µ + b gt)dt + σdb Zt , (32)
15which shows that the shocks to total capital are perfectly correlated with db Zt. Capital shocks
would aﬀect the SDF in the same way even if all the parameters were known.
Impact shocks, measured by σπ,0db Zt, are also perfectly correlated with db Zt, but they are
induced by learning about the impact of the old policy (g0). Recall from equation (9) that
the revisions in agents’ beliefs about g0, denoted by db gt, are perfectly correlated with db Zt. It
follows from equation (30) that impact shocks aﬀect the SDF more when the sensitivity of
marginal utility to variation in b gt is larger (i.e., when ∂Ω/∂b gt is larger), when the uncertainty
about g0 is larger (i.e., when b σt is larger), as well as when the precision of the b gt shocks is
larger (i.e., when σ−1 is larger). Impact shocks capture the unexpected variation in marginal
utility resulting from learning about the old policy’s impact.
As noted above, both capital shocks and impact shocks are driven by the same underlying
shocks db Zt. Since the db Zt shocks representperceivedshocks to aggregate capital (see equation
(32)), they aﬀect the aggregate fundamentals of the economy. Therefore, we refer to both
capital shocks and impact shocks jointly as economic shocks.
The third and ﬁnal type of shocks, political shocks, are orthogonal to economic shocks.
Political shocks, measured by
PN
n=1 σπ,ndb Zn
c,t, arise due to learning about political costs
{Cn}
N
n=1 (see equation (13)). The db Zn
c,t shocks are independent of the db Zt shocks; hence
the orthogonality between political and economic shocks. It follows from equation (31) that
political shocks have a bigger eﬀect on the SDF when the sensitivity of marginal utility to
b cn
t (∂Ω/∂b cn
t ) is larger, when the uncertainty about political costs (b σc,t) is larger, as well as
when the precision of the political signals (h−1) is larger.
Interestingly, the importance of political shocks for the SDF is state-dependent as a result
of the dependence of the sensitivity ∂Ω/∂b cn
t on b gt. When b gt is large, this sensitivity is close
to zero, and so is σπ,n. In fact, we can prove the following corollary.
Corollary 3: As b gt → ∞, σπ,n → 0 for all n = 1,...,N.
This corollary shows that the number of priced factors is eﬀectively endogenous. There
are N + 1 shocks in equation (29) but as b gt grows, the inﬂuence of the N political shocks
diminishes, and in the limit as b gt → ∞, the SDF depends only on economic shocks db Zt.
The logic behind this corollary is simple. As b gt increases, the old policy becomes increas-
ingly likely to be retained by the government at time τ (Corollary 1). In the limit, the old
policy is certain to be retained. Since the new policies are certain not to be adopted, news
about their political costs does not matter. More generally, learning about the politicians’
16preferences for the various potential new policies matters more if the old policy is more likely
to be replaced, which happens when b gt is lower. We return to this key point later on.
4.2. Stock Prices and Risk Premia
First, we derive the level of stock prices in closed form.









where Ω(St) and H (St) are given in equations (A1) and (A2) in the Appendix.
The dynamics of stock prices are presented in the following proposition.

























































Equation (34) shows that individual stock returns are driven by both economic shocks
(db Zt) and political shocks (db Zn
c,t), as well as by the ﬁrm-speciﬁc dZi
t shocks. The latter
shocks do not command a risk premium because they are diversiﬁable across ﬁrms. The
risk premium of stock i is equal to the expected rate of return µi
M since the risk-free rate is
zero.15 This risk premium, given in equation (35), does not depend on i, so it also represents




















M can be interpreted as the equity risk premium relative to the zero-coupon risk-free
bond that we use as the numeraire. Recall the discussion at the beginning of Section 4.
17Equation (36) shows that the risk premium has three components corresponding to the three
types of shocks introduced earlier in the discussion of Proposition 3. Recall that impact
shocks are induced by learning about g0 (i.e., by time variation in b gt), whereas political
shocks are induced by learning about Cn (i.e., by db Zn
c,t,n = 1,...,N). Also recall that both
capital shocks and impact shocks are driven by the same economic shocks db Zt. A positive
shock db Zt increases not only current capital Bt (equation (32), a capital shock) but also
expected future capital via b gt (equation (9), an impact shock).
The last term in equation (36) represents the risk premium induced by political shocks,
which are orthogonal to economic shocks. It is interesting that political shocks command
a risk premium despite being unrelated to fundamental economic shocks. We refer to this
premium as the political risk premium, to emphasize its diﬀerence from the more traditional
economic risk premia that are driven by economic shocks. The political risk premium com-
pensates investors for political uncertainty, which makes investors uncertain about which
policy the government might adopt in the future.
The second term in (36), the risk premium induced by impact shocks, represents com-
pensation for a diﬀerent aspect of uncertainty about government policy—uncertainty about
the impact of the prevailing policy on proﬁtability (g0). If g0 were known with certainty,
this component of the risk premium would be zero. Learning about g0 aﬀects agents’ ex-
pectations of future capital growth, as well as their assessment of the probability that the
government will change its policy. Since the signals about g0 are perfectly correlated with
economic shocks (db Zt), the second term in (36) represents an economic risk premium.
The risk premium induced by capital shocks, γσ2, is independent of any state variables.
In contrast, the risk premia induced by both impact shocks and political shocks are state-
dependent because σM,n and σπ,n depend on St for all n = 0,...,N. For example, we already
know that the political risk premium goes to zero as b gt → ∞ (Corollary 3). More generally,
we show below that the political risk premium is larger in poorer economic conditions (i.e.,
when b gt is low). We also show that the risk premium induced by impact shocks varies with
economic conditions in an interesting non-monotonic fashion.
4.3. Stock Price Reaction to the Policy Decision
When the government announces its policy decision at time τ, stock prices jump. To evalu-
ate this jump, we solve for stock prices immediately before and immediately after the policy
announcement. Let Mi
τ denote the market value of ﬁrm i immediately before the announce-
18ment, and M
i,n
τ+ denote the ﬁrm’s value immediately after the announcement of policy n.
Closed-form expressions for Mi
τ and M
i,n
τ+ are given in the Appendix in Lemmas A1 and A2,
respectively. We then deﬁne each ﬁrm’s “announcement return” as the instantaneous stock
return at time τ conditional on the announcement of policy n:
R






− 1 . (37)
The announcement return depends on b gτ but not on i: all ﬁrms experience the same an-
nouncement return as they are equally exposed to changes in government policy. Therefore,
Rn also represents the aggregate stock market reaction to the announcement of policy n.
Proposition 6: If the government retains the old policy, the announcement return is
R












τe(1−γ)(T−τ)(e µn−e µ0) − 1 . (38)
If the government replaces the old policy by the new policy n, for any n ∈ {1,...,N}, the
announcement return is equal to
R









τ) − 1 . (39)
Proposition 6 provides a closed-form expression for the announcement return associated
with any government policy choice. The proposition implies the following corollary.
Corollary 4: The ratio of the gross announcement returns for any pair of policies m and n
in the set {0,1,...,N} is given by
1 + Rm (b gτ)







The corollary relates the announcement returns to the utility scores for any policy pair.
Interestingly, a given policy choice can increase investor welfare while decreasing stock prices,




























Even though policy m yields higher utility (because e µm > e µn), policy n yields a higher
announcement return (Rm < Rn). Utility is maximized by the policy with the highest
utility score e µn, whereas stock market value is maximized by the policy with the highest
value of e µn−
γ
2 (T − τ)σ2
g,n. To understand this diﬀerence, recall from equation (4) that σg,n
19measures the uncertainty about the impact of policy n on ﬁrm proﬁtability. This uncertainty
cannot be diversiﬁed away because it aﬀects all ﬁrms. As a result, this uncertainty increases
discount rates and pushes down asset prices. Adopting a policy with a high value of σg,n can
thus depress stock prices even if this policy is welfare-improving. Overall, Corollary 4 shows
that one cannot judge government policies solely by their announcements returns.
The result that stock prices and welfare can move in opposite directions is not unique
to our setting. For example, this result obtains also in a standard Lucas economy with
intermediate consumption, time-separable CRRA utility with risk aversion greater than one,
and stock prices deﬁned in terms of the consumption good. In that economy, an increase
in consumption growth improves welfare but decreases stock prices, due to consumption
smoothing: higher consumption growth leads investors to sell stocks and bonds to consume
more today, pushing interest rates up and stock prices down. There is no such intertemporal
smoothing in our model. We identify a new mechanism that can drive a wedge between prices
and welfare, namely, policy risk. Corollary 4 shows that if policies m and n are equally risky,
so that σg,m = σg,n, then prices and welfare coincide (i.e., Rm = Rn if and only if e µm = e µn).
It is diﬀerences in policy risk that separate prices from welfare in our model.
Corollary 5: Holding the utility score e µn constant, policies with higher uncertainty σg,n
elicit lower announcement returns.
Corollary 5 follows immediately from Corollary 4. Among policies delivering the same
utility, the policies with higher values of σg,n elicit less favorable stock market reactions.
5. A Two-Policy Example
In this section, we use a simple setting to illustrate our results on the risk premium, volatility,
and correlation induced by political uncertainty. We consider a special case of N = 2,
allowing the government to choose from two new policies, L and H, in addition to the old
one. We assume that both new policies are expected to provide the same level of utility a
priori, e µL = e µH. This simplifying iso-utility assumption can be motivated by appealing to
the government’s presumed good intentions—it would be reasonable for the government to
eliminate from consideration any policies that are perceived by all agents as inferior in terms
of utility. We also assume, without loss of generality, that policy H is perceived to have a
more uncertain impact on ﬁrm proﬁtability, so that σg,L < σg,H. As argued earlier, policy H
can then be viewed as the deeper reform. To ensure that both new policies yield the same
20utility, policy H must also have a more favorable expected impact, so that µL
g < µH
g . It















(T − τ)(γ − 1) . (42)
That is, the higher uncertainty of policy H must be compensated by a higher expectation.
Table 1 reports the parameter values used to calibrate the model. For the ﬁrst eight
parameters (σg, σc, µ, σ, σ1, T, τ, and γ), we choose the same annual values (2%, 10%, 10%,
5%, 10%, 20, 10, 5) as do P´ astor and Veronesi (2012). The remaining three parameters (h,
σg,L, and σg,H) do not appear in P´ astor and Veronesi’s model. We choose h = 5%, equal to
the value of σ, so that the speed of learning about each Cn is the same as the speed of learning
about gn. We choose σg,L = 1% and σg,H = 3%, so that the prior uncertainties about the
new policies are symmetric around the old policy’s σg = 2%. In addition, we require that the
new-policy means be symmetric around the old-policy mean of zero, that is, µg,L = −µg,H.
It then follows from equation (42) that µg,L = −0.8% and µg,H = 0.8%. Finally, we assume
that learning about Cn begins at time t0 = τ −1, which means that political debates about
the new policies begin one year before the policy decision. All of these parameter choices
strike us as reasonable, but we also perform some sensitivity analysis.
Figure 1 plots the adoption probabilities of the three government policy choices: the old
policy 0 and the new policies H and L. The probabilities are computed as of time t = τ −1
when the political debates begin.16 They are plotted as a function of ˆ gt, the posterior mean
of g0 at time t, which is the key state variable summarizing economic conditions. High values
of b gt indicate that the prevailing government policy is helping make ﬁrms highly proﬁtable,
which is generally indicative of strong economic conditions. Similarly, low values of b gt tend
to indicate low proﬁtability and thus weak economic conditions.17 We set the values of b cL
τ
and b cH
τ equal to their initial values at time 0 (b cL
τ = b cH
τ = −σ2
c/2) to make both new policies
equally likely; as a result, the solid and dotted lines coincide. We label policy H as the “new
risky policy” and policy L as the “new safe policy” (since σg,H > σg,L).
Figure 1 shows that when b gt is very low, the probability that the old policy will be retained
is close to zero. A low b gt indicates that the old policy is “not working,” so the government
16As of time 0, the probabilities of policies 0, L, and H are 63.4%, 18.3%, and 18.3%, respectively.
17The value of b gt is determined by the cumulative eﬀect of all aggregate proﬁtability shocks before time
t (see equation (9)). A high value of b gt implies high average realized proﬁtability, and vice versa. Plotting
a quantity against b gt is equivalent to plotting it against the average realized proﬁtability computed across
many paths of shocks simulated from our model. To the extent that strong (weak) economic conditions
are characterized by high (low) aggregate proﬁtability, b gt is a natural measure of economic conditions.
Furthermore, b gt is the only economic state variable in the model, as noted earlier.
21is likely to replace it (Corollary 1). Both new policies receive equal probabilities of almost
50% when b gt is very low. In contrast, when b gt is very high, the old policy is almost certain
to be retained because a high b gt boosts the old policy’s utility score. It is possible for the
government to replace the old policy even when b gt is high—this happens if the government
derives an unexpectedly large political beneﬁt from one of the new policies—but such an
event becomes increasingly unlikely as b gt increases. Interestingly, when b gt = 0, the old
policy has about 90% probability of being retained. This result is driven by learning about
g0. By time t, agents have learned a lot about the old policy’s impact, and the resulting
decrease in uncertainty improves the old policy’s utility score relative to the new policies
(about which there is no learning before τ). Therefore, the old policy is likely to be replaced
only if its perceived impact b gt is suﬃciently negative.
Figure 1 implies that the amount of political uncertainty in the economy is endogenous
and dependent on economic conditions. In good conditions (i.e., when b gt is high), there is
little political uncertainty because the government is expected to retain its current policy.
In bad conditions, though, political uncertainty is high because a policy change is expected
and it is uncertain which of the new policies will be adopted.
5.1. The Level of Stock Prices
We now analyze how the level of stock prices depends on economic and political shocks. We
measure the stock price level by the market-to-book ratio (Mi
t/Bi
t, or M/B).
Figure 2 plots M/B as a function of b gt for three diﬀerent combinations of b cL
t and b cH
t . In the
baseline scenario (solid line), we set b cL
t = b cH
t = −1
2σ2
c, which is the prior mean from equation
(7).18 In this scenario, policies H and L are perceived as equally likely to be adopted at




c but vary b cH
t so that one policy is
more likely than the other. In the ﬁrst scenario (dashed line), b cH
t is two standard deviations
below b cL
t , so that policy H is more likely. In the second scenario (dotted line), b cH
t is two
standard deviations above b cL
t , and policy L is more likely. All quantities are computed at
time t = τ − 1 when the political debates begin.
Figure 2 highlights the eﬀects of both economic and political shocks on stock prices.
First, consider economic shocks. These shocks are perfectly correlated with shocks to b gt (see
equations (9) and (32)), so they represent horizontal movements in Figure 2. The ﬁgure
18Note that the prior mean represents the initial values of b cL
t and b cH
t at time 0, in that b cL




22shows that the relation between M/B and b gt is monotonically increasing. Higher values of
b gt increase stock prices because they raise agents’ expectations of future proﬁts.
More interesting, the relation between M/B and b gt is highly nonlinear. This relation
is nearly ﬂat when b gt is low, steeper when b gt is high, and steeper yet when b gt takes on
intermediate below-average values. To understand this nonlinear pattern, recall from Figure
1 that the probability of retaining the old policy, p0
t, depends on b gt. When b gt is very low,
the old policy is likely to be replaced at time τ (i.e., p0
t ≈ 0). Therefore, shocks to b gt are
temporary, lasting for one year only. As a result, shocks to b gt have a small eﬀect on M/B,
and the relation between M/B and b gt is relatively ﬂat. This result is indicative of the put
protection that the government implicitly provides to the stock market. Indeed, the pattern
in Figure 2 looks roughly like the payoﬀ of a call option. Loosely invoking the logic of put-call
parity, stockholders own a call because the government wrote a put.
In contrast, when b gt is high, the old policy is likely to be retained (i.e., p0
t ≈ 1). Therefore,
shocks to b gt are permanent and the relation between M/B and b gt is steep. The relation is even
steeper for intermediate values of b gt that are mostly below the unconditional mean of zero
(for the solid line, these are values between -0.8% and 0.3% or so). For those intermediate
values, p0
t is highly sensitive to b gt—a positive shock to b gt substantially increases p0
t (see Figure
1). Therefore, a positive shock to b gt gives a “double kick” to stock prices—in addition to
raising expected proﬁtability, it also reduces the probability of a policy change. The latter
eﬀect lifts stock prices because retaining the old policy, whose uncertainty has been reduced
through learning, tends to be good news for stocks for those intermediate values of b gt.
Political shocks also exert a strong and state-dependent eﬀect on stock prices. These
shocks are due to revisions in b cL
t and b cH
t (see equation (13)), so they represent vertical
movements in Figure 2. These shocks matter especially when b gt is very low, i.e., in poor
economic conditions. For example, when b gt = −2%, increasing b cH
t by two standard deviations
pushes M/B up by 8% (dashed line vs. solid line), and then by another 9% (solid line vs.
dotted line). M/B rises because a higher value of b cH
t makes policy H less likely relative to
policy L, and policy H has a more adverse eﬀect on stock prices (Corollary 5). In contrast,
political shocks do not matter in strong economic conditions—when b gt is above 1% or so,
the three lines in Figure 2 coincide. When b gt is very high, the old policy is almost certain
to be retained, so news about the political costs of the new policies is irrelevant.
To summarize, Figure 2 shows that economic and political shocks, which are orthogonal
to each other, exert important independent inﬂuenceson stock prices. Political shocks matter
especially in poor economic conditions (i.e., when b gt is low), whereas economic shocks matter
23at all times but especially in slightly-below-average conditions.
5.2. The Risk Premium and Its Components
We now examine the equity risk premium and its three components from equation (36).
Figure 3 plots the three components as a function of b gt. The component due to capital
shocks is plotted in blue at the bottom, the component due to impact shocks is plotted in
green in the middle, and the component due to political shocks is plotted in red at the top.
As before, b cL
t and b cH
t are set equal to their prior mean, so that policies L and H are equally
likely, and all quantities are computed at time t = τ − 1.
Figure 3 shows a hump-shaped pattern in the risk premium. The premium is about 4%
per year when b gt is either high or low, but it is 5.5% for intermediate values of b gt. This hump-
shape is not induced by the capital-shock component, which contributes a constant 1.25%
regardless of b gt. Instead, this pattern results from the state dependence of the political-shock
and impact-shock components, which are discussed next.
The political risk premium is the largest component of the total risk premium when b gt is
low. This component accounts for almost two thirds of the total premium when b gt is below
-1.5% or so, contributing about 2.5% per year. This contribution shrinks as b gt increases, and
for b gt > 0.3% or so, the political risk premium is essentially zero. The non-linear dependence
of the political risk premium on b gt is closely related to the non-linear probability patterns
in Figure 1. When b gt is below -1.5% or so, the probability of a policy change one year later
is essentially one, so the uncertainty about which new policy will be adopted has a large
impact on the risk premium. In contrast, when b gt > 0.3%, the probability of a policy change
is very close to zero. Since it is virtually certain that the potential new policies will not be
adopted, news about their political costs does not merit a risk premium.
The impact-shock component is the largest component of the risk premium when b gt is
high. When b gt is above 0.5% or so, this component contributes about 2.5% per year to the
total premium. Its contribution is even higher, about 3.5%, when b gt is close to zero, but
it is much lower, only about 0.2%, when b gt is very low. This interesting non-monotonicity
is also related to policy probabilities, as discussed earlier in Figure 2. When b gt is low, the
probability of a policy change is high; as a result, shocks to b gt are temporary and they have
a small eﬀect on the risk premium. This result reﬂects the quasi-benevolent nature of the
government—by essentially guaranteeing a policy change if economic conditions turn bad,
the government eﬀectively provides a put option to the market.
24This put option is worth little when b gt is high because a policy change is then unlikely.
Given the longer-lasting nature of the shocks to b gt, the risk premium induced by impact
shocks is higher when b gt is high. The premium is even higher for intermediate values of b gt
for which the probability of a policy change is highly sensitive to b gt. A negative shock to
b gt then depresses stock prices not only directly, by reducing expected proﬁtability, but also
indirectly, by increasing the probability of a policy change. The indirect eﬀect is negative
because a higher likelihood of a policy change is bad news for stocks for intermediate values
of b gt. Given the double eﬀect of the b gt shocks, investors demand extra compensation for
holding stocks in intermediate economic conditions. For example, when b gt = 0, impact
shocks account for about two thirds of the 5% total risk premium.
Overall, Figure 3 shows that the composition of the equity risk premium depends on
economic conditions. In strong conditions, the equity premium is driven by economic shocks,
whereas in weak conditions, it is driven mostly by political shocks. In those weak conditions,
the risk premium is aﬀected by two opposing forces. On the one hand, the premium is reduced
by the implicit put option provided by the government. On the other hand, the premium is
boosted by the uncertainty about which new policy the government might adopt. The two
forces roughly cancel out for the parameter values used here. An additional force, which
operates in intermediate economic conditions, is the uncertainty about whether the current
policy will be replaced. Due to that uncertainty, the largest values of the equity premium in
Figure 3 obtain in slightly-below-average economic conditions.
5.3. Comparative Statics
Figures 4 and 5 examine the robustness of the results from Figure 3 to other parameter
choices. In Panels A and B of Figure 4, we replace the baseline value σg = 2% by 1%
and 3%, while keeping all remaining parameters at their values from Table 1. We see that
σg aﬀects primarily the impact-shock component of the risk premium, which is larger for
higher values of σg. This is intuitive because when σg is higher, the old policy’s impact is
more uncertain, and the b gt shocks are more volatile (see equations (9) and (10)). In Panels
C and D, we replace the baseline value σc = 10% by 5% and 20%. We see that σc aﬀects
mostly the political-shock component of the risk premium, which is higher when σc is higher.
This makes sense because larger values of σc make political costs more uncertain, thereby
increasing the volatility of political shocks (see equations (13) and (14)). In Panels A and B
of Figure 5, we replace the baseline value h = 5% by 2.5% and 10%. Similar to σc, h aﬀects
primarily the political risk premium. This premium is lower when h is higher because the
25signals about political costs are then less precise. As a result, learning about these costs is
slower and political shocks are less volatile (see equations (13) and (14)). In Panels C and D,
we replace the baseline value τ −t = 1 year by 1.5 and 0.5 years. This change aﬀects mostly
the impact-shock component. When time τ is closer, two things happen. First, the posterior
uncertainty about g0 is smaller, which pushes the impact-shock component down. Second,
the probability of a policy change is more sensitive to the b gt shocks for intermediate values
of b gt, which pushes the impact-shock component up for such values of b gt. Overall, Figures 4
and 5 lead to the same qualitative conclusions as Figure 3 about the relative importance of
economic and political shocks in diﬀerent economic conditions.
Figure 6 provides another perspective by varying the properties of the new policies. This
ﬁgure is analogous to Figure 3, except that the new policies no longer yield the same level
of utility a priori. In Panels A and C, we replace the baseline values (σg,L,σg,H) = (1%,3%)
by (0.9%,3.1%), thereby making policy H riskier and policy L safer. We keep all remaining
parameters at their baseline values, including µL
g = −0.8% and µH
g = 0.8%. Since policy H
now yields less utility than policy L, its prior probability is smaller than that of policy L.
Indeed, in Panel C, policy L is about twice as likely as policy H at any level of b gt. In Panels
B and D of Figure 6, we replace the baseline values of σg,L and σg,H by (1.1%,2.9%), making
policy H safer and policy L riskier. Policy H then yields more utility, and it is about twice
as likely as policy L. We keep b cL
t and b cH
t equal to their initial values, as before.
The main diﬀerence between Panels A and B of Figure 6 on one side and Figure 3 on
the other is in the magnitude of the political risk premium. In Panel A, this premium
is substantially larger than in Figure 3, whereas in Panel B it is smaller. For example,
at large negative values of b gt, the political risk premium is about 4% in Panel A and 1%
in Panel B, compared to 2.5% in Figure 3. The premium is larger in Panel A because
the two new policies are more diﬀerent from each other, making the choice between them
more important. In contrast, the two policies are more similar in Panel B, reducing the
importance of uncertainty about which of them will be chosen. The total risk premium
remains a hump-shaped function of b gt in Panel B but not in Panel A. Apart from these
quantitative diﬀerences, Figure 6 reaches the same broad conclusions as Figure 3.
5.4. The Eﬀects of Policy Heterogeneity
In Figure 7, we examine how the risk premium depends on the degree to which the potential
new policies diﬀer from each other while providing the same level of welfare. Unlike in Figure
266, we put both policies H and L back on the iso-utility curve. We deﬁne policy heterogeneity
as H = σg,H−σg,L. To vary H, we vary σg,L and σg,H while keeping all other parameters ﬁxed
at their values from Table 1. In the baseline case examined in Figure 3, we have σg,L = 1%
and σg,H = 3%, so that H = 2%. In Figure 7, we consider three levels of H: 1%, 2%,
and 3%, by choosing (σg,L,σg,H) = (1.5%,2.5%),(1%,3%), and (0.5%,3.5%), respectively.
For each of the three pairs of (σg,L,σg,H), we choose µH
g and µL
g = −µH
g such that both
new policies yield the same level of utility. Panel A plots the probability of retaining the
old policy, as perceived at time t = τ − 1. The new policies are equally likely as we set
b cL
τ = b cH
τ = −σ2
c/2, as before. Panel B plots the total equity premium, whereas Panels C and
D plot its components due to economic and political shocks, respectively.
Figure 7 shows that the risk premium is generally higher when the new policies are more
heterogeneous, except in strong economic conditions. This relation is driven mostly by the
premium’s political shock component in poor economic conditions. At large negative values
of b gt, the political risk premium is 0.7% when H = 1% and 5.7% when H = 3%, compared to
2.5% in the baseline case. Not surprisingly, when the new policies are more heterogeneous,
uncertainty about which of them will be chosen is more important. In addition, more hetero-
geneity increases the importance of the decision whether to retain the old policy, resulting
in a higher impact shock component. Adding up the two eﬀects across Panels C and D, the
total risk premium in Panel B strongly depends on the menu of policies considered by the
government, except in good economic conditions when no policy change is expected.
Figure 8 describes the same setting as Figure 7, but it focuses on the stock price level
(M/B), the volatility of individual stock returns, and the correlation between each pair of
stocks. First, consider the baseline case of H = 2% (solid line). The stock price level in
Panel B exhibits the same hockey-stick-like pattern as it does in Figure 2, for the same
reason—the government’s implicit put option supports stock prices in poor economic condi-
tions. Panels C and D show that stocks are more volatile and more highly correlated when
economic conditions are poor. Comparing very good conditions (b gt = 2%) with very bad
ones (b gt = −2%), volatility is almost 50% higher in bad conditions (19.5% versus 13.4%)
and the pairwise correlation is over 70% higher (74% versus 43%). The reason is that polit-
ical uncertainty is higher in bad economic conditions, as discussed earlier. This uncertainty
aﬀects all ﬁrms, so it cannot be fully diversiﬁed away.
Departing from the baseline case and looking across the three values of H in Panel B
of Figure 8, we see that higher heterogeneity generally implies lower stock prices, but only
in weak economic conditions. This result is easy to understand. More policy heterogeneity
27means more political uncertainty, especially in weak conditions, as discussed earlier. The
higher political uncertainty translates into higher risk premia (see Panel A), which push stock
prices down. Higher heterogeneity also generally implies higher volatilities and correlations,
as shown in Panels C and D. For example, in poor economic conditions, the correlation is
86% when H = 3% but only 48% when H = 1%. Again, more heterogeneity means more
political uncertainty, and political shocks aﬀect all ﬁrms. Finally, note that in the special
case of H = 0 (not plotted), the political risk premium in Panel D of Figure 7 is zero, and
both volatility and correlation in Figure 8 are independent of economic conditions.
5.5. Policy Changes Allowed Versus Precluded
In this subsection, we compare the model-implied stock prices with their counterparts in
the hypothetical scenario in which policy changes are precluded. This scenario matches our
model in all respects except that the government cannot change its policy at time τ. The
key pricing quantities—the equity risk premium, M/B, stock volatility, and correlation—in
this hypothetical scenario are plotted by the dash-dot line in each panel of Figure 8.
At high positive values of b gt, the dash-dot line coincides with the other lines plotted in
Figure 8. The reason is that when b gt is high, the government ﬁnds it optimal not to change
its policy, so the constraint precluding it from changing policy is not binding.
The dash-dot line is ﬂat in three of the four panels. Eliminating the government’s ability
to change its policy eliminatesboth political uncertainty and the put option discussed earlier.
As a result, the risk premium, volatility, and correlation are all independent of b gt when
the policy cannot be changed. Precluding policy changes can increase or decrease the risk
premium, depending on policy heterogeneity. When H is low, the put option aﬀects the risk
premium more than political uncertainty does, and so precluding policy changes raises the
risk premium. The opposite happens when H is medium or high. In contrast, precluding
policy changes always reduces the volatility and correlation, for all three levels of H. The
reason is that uncertainty about the political costs of the potential new policies is irrelevant
when the government cannot change its policy. Due to political uncertainty, the government’s
ability to change its policy makes stocks more volatile and more highly correlated.
Interestingly, Panel B of Figure 8 shows that precluding policy changes can increase or
decrease the level of stock prices. Precluding policy changes decreases M/B when b gt is highly
negative, but it increases M/B when b gt is only slightlynegative (it makeslittlediﬀerence when
b gt is positive, as noted earlier). When b gt is highly negative—in dire economic conditions—the
28government’s ability to change policy is valuable because the positive eﬀect of the put option
is stronger than the negative eﬀect of political uncertainty. In contrast, political uncertainty
is stronger in slightly-below-average conditions. Since political uncertainty increases with
policy heterogeneity, higher values of H make it more likely that precluding policy changes
increases M/B. Overall, we see that the government’s ability to change its policy has a
substantial but ambiguous eﬀect on stock prices.
6. The Jump Risk Premium
In this section, we study the risk premium at a diﬀerent point in time. Instead of quantifying
the premium before time τ as in Sections 4 and 5, we measure it at time τ, immediatelybefore
the policy decision. Before time τ, the political risk premium is induced by a continuous
stream of political shocks, which lead investors to revise their beliefs about the probabilities
of the various policy choices. At time τ, the ultimate political shock occurs when the Cn’s are
revealedand the government announces its decision. Stock prices jump at the announcement,
as shown in Section 4.3, so the risk premium at time τ is a jump risk premium.
This jump risk premium is due to political uncertainty. Before time τ, investors face
uncertainty about two events: whether the current policy will be replaced, and if so, which
new policy will be adopted. Whereas the probability of the second event depends on politi-
cal shocks only, the ﬁrst event’s probability is driven by both political and economic shocks.
Therefore, the political risk premium deﬁned as compensation for political shocks captures
only some of the uncertainty associated with government policy choice. In contrast, imme-
diately before the policy decision at time τ, all remaining uncertainty is political. Investors
observe b gτ and the only uncertainty they face pertains to the revelation of political costs.
As a result, the jump risk premium can be fully attributed to political uncertainty.
The jump risk premium is the expected announcement return at time τ, conditional on







n (b gτ) , (43)
where the probabilities pn
τ come from Corollary 2 and the announcement returns Rn come
from Proposition 6. In equilibrium, this premium is also equal to the negative of the co-
variance between the announcement return and the jump in SDF at time τ. The jump risk
premium compensates investors for holding stocks during the announcement of the govern-
29ment’s policy decision. We derive a closed-form expression for J (Sτ).
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The jump risk premium tends to be large when political costs Cn remain highly uncertain
just before time τ. Interestingly, if we increase the speed of learning about Cn (i.e., if we
reduce h), then the political risk premium before time τ goes up (because political signals
become more precise) but the jump risk premium at time τ goes down (because more of the
uncertainty about Cn is resolved before time τ). In the limiting case in which all uncertainty
about Cn is resolved by time τ, one of the pn
τ’s is equal to one while the others are zero, and
Proposition 7 immediately implies that the jump risk premium is zero.
To shed more light on the jump risk premium, Panel A of Figure 9 plots J (Sτ) as a
function of ˆ gτ for three diﬀerent levels of heterogeneity H. We use the baseline parameter
values from Table 1, while varying H in the same way as in Figures 7 and 8. Panel B plots the
probability of retaining the old policy, as perceived immediately before the policy decision.
We choose b cL
τ and b cH
τ that make both new policies equally likely, as before.
Figure 9 shows that the jump risk premium strongly depends on both ˆ gτ and H. First,
the premium is generally higher in weaker economic conditions. For example, for the baseline
case of medium H, the premium is 1% when ˆ gτ is suﬃciently low, but it is negligible when
ˆ gτ is suﬃciently large. The reason is that when ˆ gτ is large, the current policy is virtually
certain to be retained, so that investors face essentially no uncertainty related to the policy
announcement. In contrast, when ˆ gτ is low, investors know that a policy change is coming,
but they don’t know which of the new policies will be adopted. As a result, they demand a
larger compensation for jump risk in weaker economic conditions.
Figure 9 also shows that the jump risk premium increases with heterogeneity, as long
as economic conditions are suﬃciently weak. When H is low, the premium is only 27 basis
points, but when H is high, the premium rises to almost 2.3%. A larger value of H means a
larger diﬀerence between the two new policies; as a result, uncertainty about which of them
will be adopted becomes more important. Overall, Figure 9 lends further support to our
conclusions from Section 5 about the pricing of political uncertainty.
307. Empirical Analysis
In this section, we conduct some simple exploratory empirical analysis to examine the seven
main testable predictions of our model. First, the model predicts that political uncertainty
should be higher when economic conditions are worse. Second and third, stocks should be
more volatile and more correlated when political uncertainty is higher. Fourth, political
uncertainty should command a risk premium. Finally, the eﬀects of political uncertainty on
volatility, correlation, and risk premia should be stronger in a weaker economy. To preview
our results, the empirical evidence is consistent with all of these predictions, although the
degree of statistical signiﬁcance varies across the predictions.
All of the above predictions are illustrated in Section 5 for several sets of parameter
values. Let us brieﬂy remind the reader why the model makes these general predictions.
Political uncertainty is higher in weaker economic conditions because in such conditions, the
government is more likely to change its policy, and it is uncertain which of the potential new
policies will be adopted. Political uncertainty makes stocks more volatile because a given
political signal has more inﬂuence on learning about political costs when these costs are more
uncertain. The uncertainty also makes stocks more correlated because political shocks aﬀect
all ﬁrms. It commands a risk premium because it is non-diversiﬁable. Finally, the eﬀects
of political uncertainty on stock prices are stronger in a weaker economy because investors
are then more uncertain about which policy will be chosen by the government, which leads
them to respond more strongly to political shocks.
7.1. Data
In our empirical analysis, we interpret political uncertainty broadly as uncertainty about
future government actions. An important source of this uncertainty in the model is uncer-
tainty about political costs—when investors are less certain about these costs, they are also
less certain about which policy the government might adopt in the future.
To proxy for political uncertainty, we use the policy uncertainty (PU) index of Baker,
Bloom, and Davis (2011). The PU index is constructed as a weighted average of three com-
ponents. The ﬁrst component, which receives the largest weight, captures news coverage
of policy-related uncertainty. Beginning in January 1985, this component is obtained by
month-by-month searches of Google News for newspaper articles that refer to uncertainty
and the role of policy. The second component is the number of federal tax code provisions
31set to expire in coming years, obtained from the congressional Joint Committee on Taxa-
tion. The third component, the extent of disagreement among forecasters of future inﬂation
and government spending, is intended to capture elements of uncertainty about future U.S.
monetary and ﬁscal policies. Figure 10 plots the monthly time series of the PU index for
January 1985 through December 2010.19 Baker et al. note that their index “spikes around
consequential presidential elections and major political shocks like the Gulf Wars and 9/11.
Recently, it rose to historical highs after the Lehman bankruptcy and TARP legislation, the
2010 midterm elections, the Eurozone crisis, and the U.S. debt-ceiling dispute.” The PU in-
dex seems to represent a plausible way of measuring uncertainty about what the government
might do in the future. Moreover, there are no obvious alternatives.
We use two monthly measures of aggregate stock market volatility: realized and im-
plied. Realized volatility is computed from daily returns of the S&P 500 index within the
given month. Implied volatility is the average daily value of the CBOE VIX index within
the month. We also use two measures of stock correlation, representing equal- and value-
weighted averages of pairwise correlations for all stocks that comprise the S&P 500 index.
The underlying correlations for all pairs of stocks are computed from daily returns within
the month. Since both pairs of measures are highly correlated, we only plot one of each
in Figure 10: equal-weighted correlation in Panel A and realized volatility in Panel B. For
aesthetic purposes, we smooth both variables by plotting their six-month moving averages
(we use the unsmoothed raw values in subsequent regressions). The ﬁgure shows strong
comovement between both variables and PU, especially since year 2000.
We use ﬁve monthly measures of economic conditions. Three of these are macroeconomic
variables: the Chicago Fed National Activity Index (CFI), constructed by the Federal Re-
serve from 85 monthly indicators of economic activity; the NBER recession dummy (REC),
equal to one during recession months and zero otherwise; and month-to-month industrial
production growth (IPG), obtained from the Board of Governors. The other two measures
are ﬁnancial market variables. Our stock market measure of economic conditions is the
cyclically adjusted price-to-earnings ratio for the aggregate stock market (P/E), downloaded
from Robert Shiller’s website. Our bond market measure is the default spread (DEF), the
diﬀerence between the yields of AAA and BBB corporate bonds, from Federal Reserve. All
ﬁve variables represent natural choices at the monthly data frequency.
19We downloaded the PU index data from Nick Bloom’s website on October 17, 2011. The index data
are regularly updated on www.policyuncertainty.com. In both panels of Figure 10, PU is scaled to have the
same mean and volatility as the other variable plotted in the same panel.
327.2. Political Uncertainty and Economic Conditions
The model predicts that uncertainty about the government’s future policy choice is generally
larger in weaker economic conditions, because that is when the government is more likely to
change its policy.20 Indeed, Figure 10 shows that the PU index tends to be higher during
recessions. To examine the prediction more formally, we ﬁrst run a simple regression of the
PU index on a measure of economic conditions:
PUt = a + b Et + et , (44)
where Et is one of the ﬁve measures of economic conditions: CFI, -REC, IPG, P/E, or -DEF.
We ﬂip the signs on REC and DEF so that higher values of each of the ﬁve measures indicate
better economic conditions; as a result, the model predicts b < 0 for each measure of Et. In
addition, we run the regression
PUt = a + b Et + c PUt−1 + et , (45)
adding a lag of PU to soak up the serial correlation in the PU index. The autocorrelation
of the residuals from the regression of PUt on PUt−1 is essentially zero (-0.01). As a further
precaution against autocorrelated residuals, we compute Newey-West standard errors with
three lags, and verify that using one or six lags leads to identical conclusions regarding the
statistical signiﬁcance of b in each of the 10 regressions (two regressions times ﬁve measures
of Et). The sample period is January 1985 through December 2010.
Table 2 reports the OLS estimates of the slope coeﬃcients b, together with their Newey-
West t-statistics. Consistent with the model’s prediction, all 10 point estimates of b are
negative. Eight of the 10 estimates are statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level, and one other
estimate is signiﬁcant at the 10% level. This evidence suggests that political uncertainty
indeed tends to be higher when economic conditions are worse.
7.3. Stock Market Volatility and Correlations
According to the model, stocks should be more volatile and more correlated at times of
higher political uncertainty. Indeed, Figure 10 reveals a strong association between PU and
20There is some independent empirical support for the model’s prediction that governments are more
likely to change their policies in weak economic conditions. For example, Bruno and Easterly (1996) ﬁnd
that inﬂation crises tend to be followed by reforms. Drazen and Easterly (2001) and Alesina, Ardagna, and
Trebbi (2006) also ﬁnd evidence supporting the hypothesis that crises induce reforms, although the former
study ﬁnds this evidence only for a subset of the crisis indicators.
33both volatility and correlation, especially in the second half of the sample. To assess the
signiﬁcance of this association, we consider the following regressions:
V Ct = a + b PUt + et (46)
V Ct = a + b PUt + c V Ct−1 + et , (47)
where V C stands for either volatilityor correlation. Adding V Ct−1 in the second speciﬁcation
removes most of the serial correlation in V C; the autocorrelation of the residuals from the
regression of V Ct on V Ct−1 is always within 0.17 of zero, for all four measures of V C (two
volatilities, two correlations). As before, we compute Newey-West standard errors with three
lags, and verify that using one or six lags leads to identical conclusions.
Table 3 reports the OLS estimates of b and their t-statistics. We ﬁnd b > 0 in all
eight regressions (four measures of V C, two speciﬁcations), as the model predicts. All eight
coeﬃcients are highly statistically signiﬁcant. This evidence suggests that stocks are indeed
more volatile and more correlated when there is more political uncertainty.
The model also predicts that the associations between political uncertainty and V C
should be more positive when economic conditions are worse. The reason is that political
shocks exert a larger inﬂuence on stock prices in a weaker economy (see Figures 2 and 8).
To evaluate this prediction, we run the following regressions with interaction terms:
V Ct = a + b PUt Et + c PUt + d Et + et (48)
V Ct = a + b PUt Et + c PUt + d Et + e V Ct−1 + et . (49)
The model predicts b < 0. Table 4 shows strong support for this prediction when V C denotes
volatility, but only weak support when it stands for correlation. For correlation, the point
estimate of b is negative in 17 of the 20 speciﬁcations (two measures of correlation times ﬁve
measures of Et times two regressions), but only ﬁve estimates are signiﬁcantly negative at the
5% level. For volatility, all 20 point estimates are negative, and 18 of them are signiﬁcant.
7.4. The Equity Risk Premium
The model predicts that political uncertainty commands a risk premium, especially in weak
economic conditions. However, the model also predicts that an opposing force, the govern-
ment’s put protection, reduces risk premia in weak conditions. In Figure 3, the two forces
roughly cancel out, but either can prevail for other parameter values (Figures 4, 5, and 6).
The two forces seem diﬃcult to separate empirically because, according to the model, they
34operate in similar states of the world—we tend to be more uncertain about future govern-
ment actions when the government’s put protection is more valuable. The PU index may
thus reﬂect not only political uncertainty, which it was designed to capture, but also some
degree of put protection. If the put’s inﬂuence on the PU index is small, then the model
predicts a positive PU risk premium, but if it is large, the prediction is unclear.
To proxy for the equity risk premium, we use realized future excess market returns,
denoted by Rt+1,t+h. We construct Rt+1,t+h by computing the cumulative return on the
CRSP value-weighted market portfolio over months t+ 1 through t+ h and subtracting the
cumulative return on the one-month T-bill. We consider h = 3, 6, and 12 months.
In a simple regression of Rt+1,t+h on PUt, the estimate of the slope coeﬃcient is positive
at all three horizons, but it is never statistically signiﬁcant. Even when we add the ﬁve
measures of economic conditions on the right-hand side of the regression, all three estimates
of the slope on PUt remain positive but insigniﬁcant. There might be no unconditional
risk premium associated with the PU index. It is also possible, though, that 26 years of
monthly returns is simply not enough to ensure decent power for this test. Stock returns are
notoriously noisy, making realized returns a rough proxy for expected returns.
We then look for a conditional political risk premium, motivated by the model’s implica-
tion that political shocks have a larger eﬀect on stock prices in weaker economic conditions
(see Figures 2 through 7). To see whether the PU index indeed commands a higher risk
premium when the economy is weaker, we run the regression
Rt+1,t+h = a + b PUt Et + c PUt + d Et + et . (50)
Table 5 reports the OLS estimates of b for 15 speciﬁcations (ﬁve measures of Et times three
h’s). The t-statistics are computed based on Newey-West standard errors with h lags. The
evidence suggests that b < 0, though not overwhelmingly: while all 15 point estimates are
negative, only six of them are signiﬁcant at the 5% level. The evidence is strongest for
h = 12 months, when b is signiﬁcantly negative at the 10% level under all ﬁve measures of
Et. We conclude that, despite the relatively short sample, there seems to be some evidence
of a political risk premium that is higher in weaker economic conditions.
Finally, we emphasize that our simple empirical analysis is only illustrative. Despite the
commendable eﬀort of its authors, the PU index is not a perfectly clean measure of uncer-
tainty about future government policy. For example, the index might also reﬂect broader
economic uncertainty to some extent. Its shortcomings notwithstanding, we view this index
as adequate for our purposes because it is the only index of its kind, to our knowledge, and
35because constructing a purer index is well beyond the scope of this paper. This paper’s
main contribution is theoretical—to develop and analyze an equilibrium model in which
stock prices respond to political shocks. The model makes a rich set of predictions, and the
purpose of our empirical analysis is to provide a quick ﬁrst look at the empirical validity of
these predictions. We do not go beyond our brief examination in an eﬀort to keep the paper
focused and reasonably short. But since our ﬁrst look indicates preliminary success, we hope
that future research will examine the model’s predictions in more detail.
8. Conclusions
We examine the eﬀects of political uncertainty on stock prices through the lens of a general
equilibrium model of government policy choice. In the model, the government tends to
change its policy when the economy is weak, eﬀectively providing put protection to the
market. However, the value of this implicit put protection is reduced by political uncertainty.
This uncertainty commands a risk premium even though political shocks are orthogonal to
fundamental economic shocks. The risk premium induced by political uncertainty is larger
in a weaker economy. Political uncertainty also makes stocks more volatile and more highly
correlated, especially when the economy is weak. Larger heterogeneity among the potential
new government policies increases risk premia as well as volatilities and correlations of stock
returns. We ﬁnd some empirical support for the model’s key predictions.
Our analysis opens several paths for future research. For example, it would be useful to
extend our model by endogenizing the political costs of government policies, relying on the
insights from the political economy literature. Such an extension could link asset prices to
various political economy variables. Other extensions could shift the focus from stocks to
other assets, such as bonds or currencies. We empirically examine one time-series proxy for
political uncertainty in the U.S.; future work could construct other proxies and look across
countries. More work on the government’s role in asset pricing is clearly warranted.
36Appendix
The Appendix contains selected formulas that are mentioned in the text but omitted
for the sake of brevity. The proofs of all results are available in the companion Technical
Appendix, which is downloadable from the authors’ websites.
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37Lemma A1: Immediately before the policy announcement at time τ, the market value of









































Lemma A2: Immediately after the announcement of policy n at time τ, for any n ∈














This table reports the baseline parameter values used to produce the subsequent theory ﬁgures. All variables
are reported on an annual basis (except for γ, which denotes risk aversion). The parameter choices for the
ﬁrst 8 parameters are identical to those in P´ astor and Veronesi (2012). The value of h = 5% is chosen equal
to the value of σ, to equate the speeds of learning about the policy impacts and political costs. The prior
uncertainties about the new policies, σg,L = 1% and σg,H = 3%, are chosen to be symmetric around the old
policy’s σg = 2%.
σg σc µ σ σ1 T τ γ h σg,L σg,H
2% 10% 10% 5% 10% 20 10 5 5% 1% 3%
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Political Uncertainty and Economic Conditions
This table addresses the question “Is there more political uncertainty when economic conditions are worse?”
The table reports the estimated slope coeﬃcients b and their t-statistics from the following two regressions:
Speciﬁcation 1: PUt = a + bEt + et
Speciﬁcation 2: PUt = a + bEt + cPUt−1 + et .
Political uncertainty PUt is proxied by the policy uncertainty index of Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2011), which
we scale down by 100. We use ﬁve diﬀerent monthly proxies for economic conditions Et: the Chicago Fed
National Activity Index (CFI), minus the NBER recession dummy (-REC), industrial production growth
(IPG), Shiller’s price-to-earnings ratio for the aggregate stock market (P/E), and minus the AAA-BBB
corporate bond default spread (-DEF). Since higher values of each proxy indicate better economic conditions,
our theory predicts b < 0. The t-statistics, reported in parentheses, are computed based on Newey-West
standard errors with three lags. The sample period is January 1985 through December 2010.
Measure of Economic Conditions
CFI -REC IPG P/E -DEF
Speciﬁcation 1 -0.31 -0.69 -20.95 -0.02 -0.75
(-7.24) (-5.12) (-4.10) (-3.38) (-8.61)
Speciﬁcation 2 -0.05 -0.09 -2.90 -0.00 -0.09
(-3.90) (-2.75) (-1.85) (-1.58) (-3.06)
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Political Uncertainty, Volatility, and Correlation
This table asks: “Are stocks more volatile and more correlated when there is more political uncertainty?”
The table reports the estimated slope coeﬃcients b and their t-statistics from the following two regressions:
Speciﬁcation 1: V Ct = a + bPUt + et
Speciﬁcation 2: V Ct = a + bPUt + cV Ct−1 + et .
PUt is the policy uncertainty index of Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2011), divided by 100. V Ct stands for
either volatility or correlation. We use two correlation measures, which represent equal-weighted (EW) and
value-weighted (VW) averages of pairwise correlations for all stocks that comprise the S&P 500 index. We
use two market volatility measures: realized volatility of the S&P 500 index, computed from daily index
returns within the month, and implied volatility, measured by the average daily value of the CBOE VIX
index within the month. The t-statistics are computed based on Newey-West standard errors with three
lags. The sample period is January 1985 through December 2010, except for the regressions that involve
VIX, for which the sample begins in January 1990 due to limited data availability.
Correlation Volatility
EW VW Realized Implied
Speciﬁcation 1 0.17 0.15 0.01 0.08
(9.81) (7.25) (4.81) (5.27)
Speciﬁcation 2 0.09 0.07 0.00 0.01
(6.43) (5.14) (3.45) (2.53)
41Table 4
Political Uncertainty, Volatility, Correlation, and Economic Conditions
This table addresses the question: “Are stock volatilities and correlations more positively associated with
political uncertainty when economic conditions are weaker?” The table reports the estimated slope coeﬃcients
b and their t-statistics from the following two regression speciﬁcations:
Speciﬁcation 1: V Ct = a + bPUtEt + cPUt + dEt + et
Speciﬁcation 2: V Ct = a + bPUtEt + cPUt + dEt + eV Ct−1 + et .
PUt is the policy uncertainty index of Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2011), divided by 100. V Ct stands for
either volatility or correlation. We use two correlation measures, which represent equal-weighted (EW) and
value-weighted (VW) averages of pairwise correlations for all stocks that comprise the S&P 500 index. We
use two market volatility measures: realized volatility of the S&P 500 index, computed from daily index
returns within the month, and implied volatility, measured by the average daily value of the CBOE VIX
index within the month. We use ﬁve proxies for economic conditions Et: the Chicago Fed National Activity
Index (CFI), minus the NBER recession dummy (-REC), industrial production growth (IPG), Shiller’s price-
to-earnings ratio for the aggregate stock market (P/E), and minus the AAA-BBB corporate bond default
spread (-DEF). Since higher values of each proxy indicate better economic conditions, our theory predicts
b < 0. The t-statistics are computed based on Newey-West standard errors with three lags. The sample
period is January 1985 through December 2010, except for the regressions that involve VIX, for which the
sample begins in January 1990 due to limited data availability.
Measure of Economic Conditions
CFI -REC IPG P/E -DEF
Panel A. Speciﬁcation 1
Correlation: EW -0.03 -0.04 -3.53 -0.00 -0.00
(-2.41) (-0.96) (-2.36) (-0.00) (-0.08)
Correlation: VW -0.03 -0.03 -3.54 -0.00 0.04
(-1.92) (-0.60) (-2.03) (-0.26) (1.28)
Volatility: Realized -0.00 -0.01 -0.39 -0.00 -0.00
(-5.46) (-4.39) (-4.52) (-3.74) (-3.17)
Volatility: Implied -0.04 -0.12 -3.48 -0.01 -0.05
(-4.50) (-3.69) (-3.18) (-5.48) (-1.91)
Panel B. Speciﬁcation 2
Correlation: EW -0.02 -0.03 -2.35 0.00 -0.00
(-2.04) (-1.07) (-1.97) (0.05) (-0.05)
Correlation: VW -0.02 -0.03 -2.04 -0.00 0.02
(-1.48) (-0.79) (-1.54) (-0.10) (1.13)
Volatility: Realized -0.00 -0.01 -0.21 -0.00 -0.00
(-4.11) (-3.86) (-3.11) (-2.77) (-2.58)
Volatility: Implied -0.01 -0.05 -0.19 -0.00 -0.03
(-2.81) (-3.71) (-0.36) (-2.76) (-2.70)
42Table 5
Political Uncertainty and the Equity Risk Premium
This table asks: “Does political uncertainty command a risk premium that is higher in weaker economic
conditions?” The table reports the estimated slope coeﬃcients b and their t-statistics from the regression
Rt+1,t+h = a + bPUtEt + cPUt + dEt + et .
Rt+1,t+h is the aggregate stock market return in excess of the one-month T-bill rate over h = 3, 6, and 12
months followingmonth t. PUt is the policy uncertainty index of Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2011), divided by
100. We use ﬁve proxies for economic conditions Et: the Chicago Fed National Activity Index (CFI), minus
the NBER recession dummy (-REC), industrial production growth (IPG), Shiller’s price-to-earnings ratio for
the aggregate stock market (P/E), and minus the AAA-BBB corporate bond default spread (-DEF). Since
higher values of each proxy indicate better economic conditions, our theory predicts b < 0. The t-statistics,
reported in parentheses, are computed based on Newey-West standard errors with the number of lags equal
to h. The sample period is January 1985 through December 2010.
Measure of Economic Conditions
Horizon CFI -REC IPG P/E -DEF
3 months -0.02 -0.05 -0.89 -0.01 -0.03
(-1.30) (-1.24) (-0.71) (-2.17) (-1.19)
6 months -0.04 -0.11 -2.50 -0.01 -0.09
(-2.09) (-1.53) (-1.17) (-3.18) (-1.97)
12 months -0.09 -0.21 -6.48 -0.02 -0.15
(-2.41) (-1.78) (-1.76) (-2.85) (-1.69)

























Figure 1. Probability of adopting the given government policy. This ﬁgure plots the probabilities
of the three government policy choices—the old policy, the new risky policy (H), and the new safe policy
(L)—as a function of ˆ gt, which is the posterior mean of the old policy’s impact g0 as of time t. High values
of ˆ gt indicate strong economic conditions; low values indicate weak conditions. All quantities are computed
at time t = τ − 1 when the political debates begin. The values of b cL
t and b cH
t are set equal to their initial
value at time 0 (b cL
t = b cH
t = −σ2
c/2), so that both new policies are equally likely; as a result, the solid and
dotted lines coincide. The parameters are from Table 1.














New risky policy more likely
New policies equally likely
New safe policy more likely
Figure 2. The level of stock prices: The eﬀects of economic and political shocks. This ﬁgure
plots the aggregate stock price level, measured by the market-to-book ratio M/B, as a function of ˆ gt, which
is the posterior mean of the old policy’s impact g0 as of time t. High values of ˆ gt indicate strong economic
conditions; low values indicate weak conditions. The solid line corresponds to the scenario in which b cL
t = b cH
t
are both equal to their initial value, so that both new policies are equally likely to be adopted at time τ.
The dashed (dotted) line corresponds to the scenario in which b cL
t is equal to its initial value but b cH
t is two
standard deviations below (above) the same initial value, so that the new risky (safe) policy is more likely.
Shocks to ˆ gt represent economic shocks, whereas shocks to b cL
t and b cH
t are pure political shocks. All quantities
are computed at time t = τ − 1 when the political debates begin. The parameter values are in Table 1.




























Figure 3. The equity risk premium and its components. This ﬁgure plots the equity risk premium
and its components as a function of ˆ gt, which is the posterior mean of the old policy’s impact g0 as of time
t. High values of ˆ gt indicate strong economic conditions; low values indicate weak conditions. The ﬂat blue
area at the bottom represents the component of the risk premium that is due to “capital shocks,” i.e. shocks
to capital Bt in the absence of any updating of beliefs about g0. The middle green area represents the
component of the risk premium that is due to “impact shocks,” which reﬂect learning about the old policy’s
impact g0. The top red area represents the component of the risk premium that is due to “political shocks,”
which reﬂect learning about CL and CH. The three areas add up to the total equity risk premium. The
values of b cL
t and b cH
t are set equal to their initial value at time 0, so that both new policies are equally likely.
All quantities are computed at time t = τ − 1 when the political debates begin. The parameter values are
in Table 1.
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Figure 4. The equity risk premium and its components: The eﬀects of σg and σc. Each of the
four panels is analogous to Figure 3—the ﬂat blue area at the bottom represents the risk premium due to
capital shocks, the middle green area represents the risk premium due to impact shocks, and the top red
area represents the risk premium due to political shocks. The three areas add up to the total equity risk
premium. The parameter values are in Table 1, except for σg and σc, which vary across the four panels.





















































B.   h = 10%
























C.   τ − t = 1.5
























D.   τ − t = 0.5
Figure 5. The equity risk premium and its components: The eﬀects of h and t. Each of the
four panels is analogous to Figure 3—the ﬂat blue area at the bottom represents the risk premium due to
capital shocks, the middle green area represents the risk premium due to impact shocks, and the top red
area represents the risk premium due to political shocks. The three areas add up to the total equity risk
premium. The parameter values are in Table 1, except for h and τ − t, which vary across the four panels.
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Figure 6. The equity risk premium and its components when new policies are at diﬀerent
utility levels. This ﬁgure is analogous to Figures 1 and 3, except that the new policies no longer yield
the same level of utility a priori. In Panels A and C, the new risky policy yields less utility than the new
safe policy, whereas it yields more utility in Panels B and D. In Panels A and C, the new risky policy is
riskier and the new safe policy is safer compared to the benchmark case (because σg,L = 0.9% < 1% and
σg,H = 3.1% > 3%), whereas it is the other way round in Panels B and D. With the exception of σg,L and
σg,H, all other parameters, including µL
g and µH
g , are the same as in Table 1.
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Figure 7. The equity risk premium and its components: The eﬀect of policy heterogeneity.
Panel A plots the probability of retaining the old policy, as perceived at time t = τ − 1, for diﬀerent values
of ˆ gt and three diﬀerent levels of heterogeneity among the new policies. Heterogeneity H is deﬁned as
H = σg,H − σg,L. The solid line corresponds to H = 0.02, which is the benchmark case from Table 1. The
dashed line corresponds to H = 0.03, whereas the dotted line corresponds to H = 0.01. For each of the
three pairs of (σg,L,σg,H), we choose µH
g and µL
g = −µH
g such that both new policies yield the same level
of utility. All other parameter values are in Table 1. The values of b cL
t and b cH
t are set equal to their initial
value at time 0, so that both new policies are equally likely to be adopted at time τ. Panel B plots the total
equity risk premium as a function of ˆ gt for the same three values of H. Panel C plots the component of the
total risk premium that is due to economic shocks, which include both capital shocks (i.e., shocks to Bt in
the absence of learning about g0) and impact shocks (i.e., learning about g0). Panel D plots the component
of the risk premium that is due to political shocks (i.e., learning about CL and CH).



































































































Figure 8. Stock price level, volatility, and correlation: The eﬀect of policy heterogeneity. This
ﬁgure is constructed in the same way as Figure 7 except that it plots additional quantities of interest—
the stock price level, measured by the market-to-book ratio, the volatility of each stock’s return, and the
correlation between each pair of stocks. All quantities are plotted at time t = τ −1 for diﬀerent values of ˆ gt
and three diﬀerent levels of heterogeneity among the new policies, deﬁned as H = σg,H − σg,L. In addition,
the dash-dot line in each panel represents the value of the given variable in the hypothetical scenario in
which the government cannot change its policy at time τ. Comparing the dash-dot line to the other three
lines thus highlights the eﬀect of precluding the government from changing its policy.
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Figure 9. The jump risk premium. Panel A plots the conditional expected stock return immediately
before the government’s policy decision at time τ. This jump risk premium compensates investors for the
uncertainty associated with the government’s policy decision. Panel B plots the probability of retaining the
old policy, as perceived immediately before the government’s policy decision. Both the jump risk premia
and the policy probabilities are plotted for diﬀerent values of ˆ gτ and three diﬀerent levels of heterogeneity
among the new policies, deﬁned as H = σg,H − σg,L. The values of b cL
t and b cH
t are set equal to their initial
values at time 0, so that both new policies are equally likely to be adopted at time τ. All parameter values,
except for those we need to vary in order to vary H (in the same way as in Figures 7 and 8), are in Table 1.


























































































Figure 10. Political uncertainty versus stock market correlation and volatility. The solid line in
each panel plots the policy uncertainty (PU) index of Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2011), which is our proxy
for political uncertainty. In each panel, PU is scaled to have the same mean and volatility as the other
variable plotted in the same panel. In Panel A, the other variable is the equal-weighted average of pairwise
correlations for all stocks that comprise the S&P 500 index. In Panel B, the other variable is the realized
volatility of the S&P 500 index. Both correlation and volatility are computed monthly from daily returns
within the month. The dashed lines plot both variables’ six-month moving averages between January 1985
and December 2010. The shaded areas represent NBER recessions.
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